The Economics of Sustainability: A Review of Journal Articles
John C. V. Pezzey and Michael A. Toman
∗Background
Concern about sustainability is almost as old and enduring as the dismal science itself, even though
the word itself has come into fashion only in the past decade or so. In 1798, Malthus (1798/1976)
worried about how Britain’s apparently inexorable rise in population could be sustained from a finite
amount of land. In 1865, Jevons (1865/1977) wondered how Britain’s ever-increasing energy
consumption could be sustained from finite supplies of coal. In 1952, the President’s Materials Policy
Commission (1952) was concerned about the sustainability of the American economy’s postwar
growth, given its prodigious wartime increase in the consumption of nonrenewable minerals from
apparently finite supplies. In 1972, Meadows and others pondered the sustainability of the whole of
industrial civilization, given the ultimate finiteness of the planet’s capacities to provide material
inputs to modern economies (and to assimilate their waste outputs) in
The Limits to Growth.The Limits to Growth,
provoked a response from mainstream economists, especially Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Solow
(1974), and Stiglitz (1974). Their analyses of the impact of nonrenewable resources on existing
theories of economic growth have continuing significance for the economics of sustainability; in
retrospect, it seems a little surprising that the debate largely rested there for the next decade, apart
from a few noteworthy developments. Economists interested in sustainability issues returned to the
scene in the late 1980s with the publication of
Environment and Development (WCED 1987). This publication helped to launch a new agenda for
both development and environmental economics. It voiced new and urgent environmental concerns
(deforestation, desertification, the loss of biodiversity, the enhanced greenhouse effect, and the effects
of poverty on the environment in mainly developing countries) that were especially relevant to
developing countries and the global environment. It thereby challenged many of the fundamental
goals and assumptions of the conventional, neoclassical economics of growth and development. In
addition, it propelled the ideas of “sustainability” and “sustainable development” to the forefront of
public debate.
and the general fear of "running out" that it inspired in some quarters,Our Common Future by the World Commission on∗
published journal articles, to be published by Ashgate (Aldershot, U.K.) in May 2002.
This article will be the introductory chapter in The Economics of Sustainability, a collection of previouslyResources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
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However, sustainability proved a remarkably difficult concept to define and use precisely.
Overlapping and conflicting definitions rapidly proliferated. One result was that words such as
“sustainability” and “sustainable” became common buzzwords—motherhood-and-apple-pie concepts
mouthed approvingly by anyone from media moguls to multinational mining companies—that often
meant nothing more than “environmentally desirable,” if that. Indeed, when comparing successive
versions of official environmental policy documents of the late 1980s and early 1990s, one can almost
attribute the proliferation of sustainability rhetoric to a mere find-and-replace operation.
Selection, Organization, and Presentation
Scope of Our Approach to Sustainability
In this review of refereed journal essays on the economics of sustainability, we have taken a focused
approach. For our purposes,
fairness in the long-term decisionmaking of a whole society; some recognition of the role of finite
environmental resources in long-term decisionmaking; and some recognizable, if perhaps
unconventional, use of economic concepts such as instantaneous utility, cost, or intertemporal
welfare. However, the concern for intergenerational equity may not involve explicit use of the word
“sustainability” in any form; many other formulations are possible. It also may be quite indirect, as
with a strand of the literature focused on the ecological or physical feasibility of continued economic
expansion with finite resources.
sustainability involves some concern for intergenerational equity or1For reasons of space and coherence, we decided to omit several topics that might have been included
within a broader definition of sustainability. These topics include sustainable production within
specific resource sectors (agriculture, forestry, and so on); macroeconomic “sustainable growth
models” with no environmental components, which include most of the mainstream endogenous
growth literature; the practical and philosophical impact of population growth on sustainability;
purely ecological models of sustainability; methods and practices for accounting for “green” income;
and studies of economic growth and the environment.
Selection Criteria
Any selection of reviewed papers contains some subjective elements. Our focus on refereed journal
articles inherently imposes a constraint, because a great deal of the economic writing of the activists,
campaigners, and communicators who have had the most direct influence on policy has appeared in
1
Our focus thus builds on the survey in Toman and others (1995).Resources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
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books, book chapters, conference proceedings, and “gray” literature. Therefore, we have attempted to
weave citations of some key nonjournal literature into our discussion. Also, many sustainability ideas
originated primarily as a challenge to conventional economic thinking, rather than as new ideas
within mainstream economics. We thus have reviewed an eclectic selection of papers—including
some that mainstream economists consider quite flawed—to provide readers a full range of
perspectives on the intellectual debate that surrounds the economics of sustainability.
Within the journal literature, we aim to cover key topics in and contributors to the economic debate
on sustainability. We focus mainly on primary papers, rather than surveys.
topical coverage, we have biased the selection somewhat toward including empirical papers. Real
measurement of sustainability is fraught with difficulties of principle and practice, so there are
understandably, though still disappointingly, few published empirical papers.
2 To achieve a balance ofOrganization
Three possible criteria for organizing our discussion in a coherent way are topic, methodology, and
date. Because one paper can contain a range of topics and methodologies, neither of these two criteria
offers clear-cut boundaries. Therefore, we primarily ordered the papers by date.
Even so, it is worth flagging the main topics and methodologies under which classification might be
attempted, because we occasionally found it worth departing from chronological order to discuss
closely related papers together. For clarity, we present them as simple, discrete questions; however,
reality is usually more complex, particularly in empirical papers. These questions naturally progress
from issues related to societal goals to issues involving the natural and technological constraints
encountered in attaining those goals.
•
itself or as something that has a harmful effect on aggregate sustainability? Do the three goals
of environmental sustainability, economic sustainability, and social sustainability all have to
be achieved in some sense for overall sustainability to be achieved, or does sustainability
permit any trade-offs among these three goals?
Is explicit attention paid to inequality within generations, either as an undesirable outcome in•
of the performance of the physical and biological systems that support society? The latter
Is the paper’s main focus on sustaining overall social welfare or on sustaining some measure2
synthesis papers.
Lele (1991) and van den Bergh and Nijkamp (1991) cover a range of topics related to sustainability in theirResources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
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focus includes studies of physical or thermodynamic limits and ecological economic analyses
of resilience.
•
human-made capital (what is often called the weak sustainability approach), or is limited
substitutability assumed (leading to the strong sustainability approach)?
Is unlimited (not the same as perfect) substitutability assumed between natural resources and•
Is technical progress exogenous, endogenous, or absent?•
inform the kind of production and utility functions that are used in the economics of
sustainability?
In addition to these broad issues, several more specific questions define the scope of different papers:
To what extent should other disciplines (such as physics, ecology, or psychology) be used to•
Are the natural resources considered mainly renewable or nonrenewable?•
Are the effects of international trade considered?•
Is pervasive uncertainty considered, or ignored in favor of determinism?•
The different methodologies used to study these topics are rather easier to classify. Many papers
could be reasonably described as empirical (some processing of real data), analytical (a mathematical
model but no data), or verbal/philosophical (no data processing or mathematics, but possibly some
closely argued logical reasoning) in approach. Some papers combine more than one of these
approaches, but not always satisfactorily, for example, when purely verbal pieces claim to resolve
inherently empirical questions about substitutability. In addition, several analytical frameworks figure
prominently, including the representative agent or overlapping generation (OLG) frameworks for
describing intertemporal production and utility.
Are preferences assumed to be fixed, or can they evolve?Discussion Format
For the reader’s convenience, we provide the full titles of the papers that are the primary focus of our
discussion in the text as well as in References. Mathematical notation is used sparingly, and when it
is, we use a standard notation (explained later) throughout, rather than the different notations used in
each reviewed paper.
Resources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
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1974–86: Responding to “Limits to Growth”
The first three papers are classics: “The Optimal Depletion of Exhaustible Resources” by Dasgupta
and Heal (1974), “Growth with Exhaustible Natural Resources: Efficient and Optimal Growth Paths”
by Stiglitz (1974), and “Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources” by Solow (1974). All
three papers came from a symposium published in the
debate following the publication of
economic growth when a nonrenewable natural resource, as well as (human-made) capital, is a
significant input to aggregate production. These three papers form an important theoretical starting
point for our review, even though they rarely used terms such as “sustainability.”
Review of Economic Studies, inspired by theThe Limits to Growth (Meadows and others 1972) on the nature of3In all three models, natural resources are finite, nonrenewable, and essential to production instead of
being ignored altogether, as they largely had been in economic growth theory until then. However,
(human-made) capital is indefinitely substitutable for resources via a Cobb–Douglas production
function. To summarize the main points of these papers, we present the following analytical
formulation:
∫
∞0
( ), ( )
max
U[C(t)] (t)dtC t R t
φ
where
(1)U
(C) = C1−θ /(1−θ )C
= F K R t − K−δK −ξR = Kα Rβ eτt − K−δK −ξR• •
( , , )
R
= − S+ G(S)•
(0) 0
0 K = K >(0) 0
0 S = S >0
<α ,β <α + β ≤ 1ξ
≥ 0,δ ≥ 0C
, R,K, S ≥ 03
environmental valuation with irreversibility, and by Ayres and Kneese (1969) on materials balance in what we
would now call ecological–economic systems.
An even earlier starting point would include the seminal papers by Krutilla (1967) on long-termResources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
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and
resource depletion;
U is instantaneous utility; C is consumption flow; φ is the utility discount factor; R is the rate ofθ is a parameter governing the curvature of the utility function; F is output flow;K
the rate of exogenous technical progress;
and
In Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and in subsequent refinements by the same authors (Dasgupta and Heal
1979) and by Pezzey and Withagen (1998), the utility discount rate is constant:
is capital stock; δ is the rate of capital depreciation; ξ is the per unit cost of resource extraction; τ isS is the resource stock; G(S) is renewable resource growth;0 0 α ,β ,ξ ,K ,S , are exogenous parameters.φ (t) = e−ρt , whereρ
that is, the maximization of the present value (PV) of the representative agent’s instantaneous utility
using a constant discount rate. Just as crucially, technical progress is absent (
is a fixed nonrenewable stock (
costs are ignored (
A key finding from Dasgupta and Heal’s 1974 analysis was that the PV-optimal outcome is grim for
far-distant generations. After perhaps an initial peak, consumption and utility eventually approach
zero in the very long run. However, this outcome is
technically infeasible. It is instead the direct consequence of a positive utility discount rate, combined
with the inherent scarcity of the nonrenewable resource. Under these circumstances, consumption is
concentrated in earlier years of relative resource plenty, and capital investment is not adequate to
offset the effects of resource depletion on output. By almost anyone’s standards, this consequence
does not represent sustainable development.
Stiglitz (1974) points out that one way to avoid to this undesirable outcome is ongoing technical
progress. In his model, the rate of exogenous technical progress is assumed to be large enough to
offset the effects of resource depletion. This assumption implies that the PV-optimal path can have
sustained increases in per capita consumption (even with a growing population, which is omitted from
Dasgupta and Heal’s model).
> 0 is the rate of time preference. So, society’s objective is what we refer to here as PV optimality,τ = 0), and the resourceG(S) = 0 for all S).4 Less crucially, the depreciation rate and extractionδ = 0, ξ = 0).not because sustained consumption and utility are4
reserves as well as resource extraction. Simple models represent an undiscovered resource stock that might be
found in the future (for example, Dasgupta and Heal 1979 and references therein). More complex models allow
for the possibility of continuous additions to new reserves at ever-increasing unit costs (for example, Pindyck
1978; Bohi and Toman 1984 and references therein). Additions to reserves forestall rising real resource scarcity,
but they do not fundamentally change the results discussed below.
In the economics of nonrenewable resources, many models have addressed discovery and development of newResources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
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In the context of Stiglitz’ model, the Cobb–Douglas production function—with isoquants asymptotic
to the axes for resource flow and capital services—is inconsistent with minimum energy and material
requirements. The same could be said of a sustained exponential rate of technical change. Instead,
some ultimate limit to production possibilities would need to be defined in relation to the flow of
renewable resources. Such limits are not addressed in the models we review in this paper, and the
empirical relevance of these constraints remains hotly debated.
5Solow (1974) finds that the solution to Dasgupta and Heal’s problem is implicitly a moral one.
However, Solow’s direct focus is on conditions under which constant consumption is feasible. In the
challenging case when technical progress is absent, Solow shows that with Cobb–Douglas production
(and a constant population), constant consumption could be sustained despite declining resource flow
by a suitable path of capital accumulation. Solow shows that to achieve constant consumption, it is
necessary to have
production.
the first widely read paper to suggest, in the context of formal economic growth theory, a
sustainability-like objective for society quite different from PV optimality.
Solow justifies his focus by referring to Rawls’ (1971) principle of maximizing the minimum realized
consumption level. However, the constant path also can be seen as the intertemporally efficient
outcome of maximizing discounted utility in Model (1) above with a nonconstant—indeed,
monotonically decreasing—discount rate (Takayama 1985, 188). Taking this perspective brings the
paper closer to the others we review in this paper. But this formulation begs another question, namely,
the consistency of such an objective function with individual preferences. This issue echoes to this
day in debates about the appropriate role for and means of discounting future benefits and costs.
For our purposes, the sequel to Solow’s 1974 paper was from Hartwick (1977): “Intergenerational
Equity and the Investing of Rents from Exhaustible Resources.” This paper, and later extensions
(Hartwick 1978a, 1978b), show what came to be known as Hartwick’s rule: Under many
circumstances in an economy with depletable resources, the rent derived from resource depletion is
exactly the level of capital investment that is always needed to achieve constant consumption over
β < α, which means the resource flow accounts for less than half the value of6 Even though Solow speaks directly of neither sustainability nor PV optimality, his was5
of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (for example, Cleveland and Ruth 1997).
See the exchanges in the September 1997 special issue of Ecological Economics devoted to the contributions6
Douglas production function and minimum energy and resource requirements. On the other hand, Solow (1974)
deliberately stacks the deck against himself by not incorporating renewable resources in the model.
Note that this condition does not address the point made earlier about the inconsistency between the Cobb–Resources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
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time. In the economy of Model (1), this level is sales revenue (
resource growth [
feasible when the resource is nonrenewable, some kind of unlimited capital resource substitutability is
needed [as with the Cobb–Douglas production function in Model(1)], so in recent times, Hartwick’s
rule has come to be known as a
resource rents is the net investment in all the economy’s productive stocks, the rule also reads as,
“Zero net investment forever results in constant consumption forever.”
In either form, Hartwick’s rule is probably the single most powerful influence on sustainability policy
that is clearly derived from an economics journal article. Many governments and multilateral
institutions have invoked it, consciously or not, when declaring the importance of investing rents
from natural resource depletion in building up capital in the rest of the economy. However,
governments rarely have been clear on how much should be invested, or how much should be
invested by the private sector versus some public “trust fund for future generations.”
Nor have governments realized what a departure from current, broadly free market policies on growth
and investment Hartwick’s rule might imply. As discussed earlier in connection with
“Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources” (Solow 1974), the constant consumption path
results from a modified PV objective with declining discount rates. If one takes the view that market
investment behavior is driven by a conventional PV objective, then Hartwick’s investment rule in
effect requires massive government intervention in capital markets (unless technical progress makes
the issue moot, as Stiglitz 1974 suggests). This issue—in effect, about the desirability of a
sustainability objective—is one that runs, sometimes implicitly but always uncomfortably, through
much of the sustainability literature. Hartwick’s rule has additional shortcomings as a practical policy
tool, as discussed in "The Beginnings of Empirical Sustainability Work" later.
Our next paper from this period is “On the Intergenerational Allocation of Natural Resources” (Solow
1986). Solow shows that Hartwick’s rule, which we already know achieves constant consumption
always, is also equivalent to maintaining aggregate wealth or “some appropriately defined stock of
capital
time. But despite an accompanying comment in the same journal by Svensson (1986), it is often
overlooked that this result assumes a constant interest rate and thus does not actually apply to the
economies of Dasgupta and Heal (1974) or, more importantly, of Solow (1974). In those analyses,
never-ending capital accumulation and resource depletion cause a falling interest rate, hence the need
for aggregate wealth to rise over time, so that the product of the interest rate and aggregate wealth can
maintain constant output and consumption. As a practical matter, moreover, problems arise in
FRR) minus both the value of naturalFRG(S)] and the value of extraction costs (ξR). For constant consumption to beweak sustainability approach. And because capital investment minus… including … resources” [which would be K + FRR in Model (1)] at a constant level overResources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
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calculating the prices needed to compute wealth or aggregate capital. (We discuss these problems
later in The Beginnings of Empirical Sustainability Work). Finally, by giving no motivation or
mechanism for a sudden introduction of Hartwick’s rule after an initial period of PV-optimal
development with lower savings rates and unsustainably high consumption, Solow does not address
the policy conflict between a PV-optimal economy and the imposition of Hartwick’s rule.
The combination of capital accumulation, resource depletion, and a falling interest rate also plays a
role in our last paper from 1974–86, “Hartwick’s Rule in Open Economies” (Asheim 1986).
7Asheim’s analysis begins with a closed economy divided into three classes of people: workers,
capitalists, and nonrenewable resource owners. He shows that Hartwick’s rule cannot, then, be
decentralized. Resource owners use a rising resource price to offset their diminishing stocks and
achieve constant consumption while investing nothing. In contrast, the price facing capitalists (the
interest rate) is in fact falling. So, to maintain its consumption, this class has to augment its capital
stocks. As a result, capitalists do all the investing, even though their own resource consumption is
zero. (More generally, resource rents in different parts of the economy need to be invested in
proportion to ownership of human-made capital, not in proportion to resource stock ownership.)
The closed-economy analysis is then neatly transferred and extended to different open economies.
Sustainability for all countries requires resource-rich economies to invest less than their own resource
rents, and resource-poor economies to invest more. The basic Hartwick’s rule does not apply to open
economies, because the underlying assumption of “stationary” technology is violated when gains
from trade are taken into account. A corrected analogue to Hartwick’s rule for open economies is
developed and applied to a model of capital accumulation and resource depletion. This result is
important because confusion has arisen regarding the implications of resource extraction for the
sustainable income of an open, resource-exporting economy.
Several other important theoretical contributions during this period addressed growth, resource use,
and intergenerational equity—notably, articles by Riley (1980), Becker (1982), and Dasgupta and
Mitra (1983)—although none of them stimulated any extensive empirical work. Another paper of the
period that is indirectly related to sustainability and has taken on significance in the literature over
time is by Krautkraemer (1985). Krautkraemer considers a generalization of the PV optimality
problem studied by Dasgupta and Heal (1974), with an environmental disamenity related to
cumulative resource use that has the economy generally use less than its entire resource stock.
7
Another interesting and relevant piece from roughly the same time is by Kemp and Van Long (1982).Resources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
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Krautkraemer shows that depending on society’s discount rate, the initial capital stock, and the nature
of the disamenity, the economy may converge over time to a “clean” (low-resource-use) or “dirty”
(high-resource-use) equilibrium. This generalization points to important issues to consider more
generally in how growth might be managed sustainably, including both direct consumption and
environmental values.
8Also of significance during the period were some developments in the philosophy of intergenerational
equity, such as those put forward by Norton (1982), Page (1983), and Parfit (1983). Such papers
paved the way for future debates about sustainability by underscoring the complex and sometimes
problematic moral underpinnings of the PV criterion and drawing attention to other moral criteria
(such as concepts of environmental justice and stewardship) that are important for intergenerational
resource allocation.
1987–96: The Emergence of a Sustainability Literature
Verbal/Philosophical Analyses
We already mentioned the seminal influence of WCED’s
the mid-1980s, active discussion of sustainability concepts and criteria began in earnest in the
economics literature as well. A notable early contribution was “The Concept of Sustainable Economic
Development” (Barbier 1987). This highly cited paper contains questions, concepts, and language
(terms such as “environmentally sustainable” and “natural capital”) that have become an enduring
part of the sustainability debate for developed as well as developing countries. Because it is presented
with a purely verbal approach, the paper requires careful reading; even then it remains open to a wide
range of interpretations.
Stress is placed on “the unique environmental, economic, and social features of sustainability
101). Much emphasis is placed on the role of poverty: “Poor people often have no choice but to opt
for immediate economic benefits at the expense of the long-run sustainability of their livelihoods” (p.
103). Concepts such as “environmentally sustainable strategies” and “socially and culturally
sustainable development” are introduced, though not precisely defined (p. 102). Barbier (1987)
presents an early illustration of the oft-repeated but sometimes ill-defined idea that environmental
sustainability, economic sustainability, and social sustainability are separate but interlinked concepts.
Our Common Future, published in 1987. In…” (p.8
assumption of a substitution elasticity between the resource and capital that is greater than 1, meaning the
resource is inessential for production.
One limitation of Krautkraemer’s 1985 analysis is that it depends in certain important places on theResources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
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But Barbier also clearly states that “sustainable development involves a
the various goals of [biological, economic, and social] systems” (emphasis in original).
A deluge of sustainability literature directed at broader audiences appeared from the late 1980s
onwards. Much of it was not published in journals, and often it was as much aspirational as analytical.
The most famous definition of “sustainable development” as “development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED
1987, 43) uses concepts of needs, or lack of compromise or tradeoff, that cannot be readily measured
or expressed in the language of conventional economics. Publications by Pearce (1988), Daly and
Cobb (1989), and Pearce and others (1989; a book whose publication produced tabloid headlines out
of environmental economics – a rare case of immediate mass influence on the body politic!), as well
as edited volumes by Collard and others (1988) and Costanza (1991), propelled the debate forward.
However, many of these pieces served to identify conundrums as much as—or more than—resolve
them. Among the first formal attempts during this time to analyze the new debate in terms of
conventional economics were publications by Pezzey (1989/1992) in the field of growth theory
(although this working paper is better known for its compilation of the dozens of sustainability
definitions that had already piled up) and by Ahmad and others (1989) in the field of national
accounts.
In “Toward Some Operational Principles of Sustainable Development,” Daly (1990) highlights three
intuitively appealing and memorable rules that are “obvious principles of sustainable development”
(pp. 2, 4):
process of trade-offs among•
Harvest rates should equal regeneration rates (sustained yield).•
which the wastes are emitted.
Waste emission rates should equal the natural assimilative capacities of the ecosystems into•
rate of depletion to the rate of creation of substitutes for those renewable resources.
These rules encapsulate a kind of “folk wisdom” already reflected in Barbier (1987, 106). Daly’s
contribution, here and elsewhere, is as much his tireless promotion of these ideas as his care in
analyzing them. To some extent Daly derives his ideas from two assumptions: that sustainability
requires total (human-made plus natural) capital to be maintained intact (although we saw in our
discussion of Solow 1986 that this may be neither necessary or sufficient), and that natural and
human-made capital are complements rather than substitutes.
Renewable energy sources should be exploited in a quasi-sustainable manner by limiting theirResources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
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Daly thus was an important architect of the “strong sustainability” view that capital-resource
substitutability is very limited, so the sustenance of specific resource sectors is very important.
Unfortunately, although this verbal proof contains a grain of truth (derived from Georgescu-Roegen
1971), it assumes that “increased capital” always means more units of exactly the same physical
technology (saws to cut timber, nets to catch fish), rather than allowing for changes in technology and
the knowledge of how to use it. Short of some ultimate physical (thermodynamic) limits, the degree
of long-term substitutability is an empirical question. As we noted earlier, empirical work on this
issue has been limited. The tendency by partisans on both sides to refer to “obvious” propositions
probably has not encouraged a much-needed empirical debate on substitutability.
“Sustainability: An Interdisciplinary Guide” (Pezzey 1992) is a long review article that (as the title
suggests) includes not only economics but also material from disciplines such as anthropology, history,
psychology, philosophy, and physics. The aim of the paper is to identify what can be said (and asked—
the paper presents more questions than answers) about sustainability defined as “non-declining utility of
a representative member of society for millennia into the future.” Its main novelty is its stress on
evolution: both the millennial evolution of “statically sustainable” societies (which use renewable
resources and constant technology) versus “dynamically sustainable” ones (which use nonrenewable
resources and changing technology), and the evolution of some “significant and durable influences” on
the form and arguments of utility functions that must be taken into account in forming sustainability
policies. In particular, Pezzey explores the implications of assuming that instantaneous utility depends on
consumption changes and relative consumption as well on absolute consumption; thus,
U
then is canceled out by relative effects. Howarth (1996b) also addresses this issue, but other authors have
not given it much attention.
“Economics and ‘Sustainability:’ Balancing Trade-offs and Imperatives” (Toman 1994) picks up on
some of the sustainability themes in the environmental philosophy literature and examines how those
themes relate to ideas in economics. As the title suggests, the dissonance in the two approaches to the
subject stems from the difference between economists’ strongly rooted belief in universal trade-offs
(that is, there is a ceiling on willingness to pay for preservation of any natural resource), and
philosophers’ views about more universal moral rules (that is, societies do not use trade-off analysis
to evaluate slavery; might not the same also be true in protecting ecological integrity?). Toman argues
that one possible link between these disparate views might be found in an extension of the “safe
minimum standard of preservation” idea developed by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1952) and Bishop (1978):
Standard trade-off analyses apply when the magnitude and duration of risks are not very large, so
=U(C,C& ,C /C ) rather than just U = U(C). Much of the apparent benefit of consumption growthResources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
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moral stakes also are relatively low; however, ethical norms become increasingly important
complements to trade-off analyses as the stakes rise (see also Norton 1992).
“‘Sustainable Development’: Is It a Useful Concept?” (Beckerman 1994) reminds everyone working
away inside the new sustainability paradigm that many of those outside it remain fiercely critical of it.
Beckerman assumes unlimited capital-resource substitutability, from which one can follow his logical
argument that “‘strong’ sustainability, overriding all other considerations, is morally unacceptable as well
as totally impractical.” Given substitutability, the aim of sustaining a particular natural resource sector
cannot be worth an unlimited sacrifice in terms of other economic assets, and insisting on such a sacrifice
could arguably be immoral. Beckerman also criticizes the leaps frequently made by advocates from some
analytical definition of sustainability (for example, constant consumption in Solow 1974) to sweeping
moral injunctions for achieving sustainability thus defined.
However, Beckerman’s argument that weak sustainability “offers nothing beyond traditional economic
welfare maximization” is, we believe, incorrect.
sustainability in the form of constant consumption departs from PV maximization. The normative basis
for weak or other sustainability criteria is open to debate, but sustainability analyses clearly are seeking
notions of intergenerational equity that go well beyond the scope of conventional welfare economics.
Howarth (1995) develops the theme that moral obligations to future generations are distinct from
altruistic individualistic preferences for the well-being of future generations. Using this rights-based
framework, Howarth explores, among other topics, the often ill-defined “precautionary principle.” Solow
(1993), on the other hand, vigorously defends more conventional reasoning on sustainability. Solow
argues in effect that if care is taken to internalize resource market inefficiencies and environmental
externalities, and if society does not discount the future too much, then a sustainable allocation of
resources—natural capital and otherwise—can result.
9
9 In our analysis of Hartwick 1977, we show that weak10Common (1996) offers similar, more extensive criticisms.10
the latter a vigorous defender of utilitarian over rights-based moral principles. Norgaard (1988) brought to the
fore the issue of a “co-evolutionary” relationship between human and ecological systems. Faucheux and Froger
(1995) addressed the importance of addressing uncertainty and even ignorance in sustainability decisionmaking,
underscoring the importance in their framework of “procedural” as well as “substantive” rationality. Ekins
(1993) and Ayres (1996) produced wide-ranging general essays on both the equity and feasibility of
sustainability as further responses to the “limits to growth” debate. A short essay by Arrow and others (1995),
while fuzzy on many important details, brought together several themes and indicated that as a topic,
sustainability had “arrived.”
Others that address this general set of issues include Page (1988, 1991), Howarth (1992), and Broome (1992),Resources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
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Analytical Papers Concerned with Sustainability, Efficiency, and Intergenerational
Equity
“Intergenerational Resource Rights, Efficiency, and Social Optimality” (Howarth and Norgaard 1990)
was seminal in showing that the classic welfare theory results regarding the effect of initial
endowments on equity and efficiency readily translate from a static to an intergenerational context.
Methodologically, this paper also brought the overlapping generations (OLG) analytical framework to
the center of sustainability research. Different “endowments” of resource rights—in this case, a
nonrenewable resource stock and labor—across two OLGs result in different distributions of wealth,
all of them efficient but obviously different in their equity implications. There is no a priori way of
saying which is “optimal.”
Howarth and Norgaard extend their 1990 model to include many generations; capital accumulation;
and in lieu of a nonrenewable resource input to production, an emissions output that accumulates and
then causes an external cost of lost production, in “Environmental Valuation under Sustainable
Development” (1992). Their key finding is that the path of consumption across time and the marginal
valuation of the environmental externality (measured by the efficient emissions tax) depend on the
distribution of wealth across generations (achieved by socially mandated income transfers from old to
young). So, even in theory, there is no fixed notion of “correctly” valuing an environmental cost: The
value varies with society’s view of the future, whether expressed as a discount rate or some
sustainability criterion. This point is relevant, for example, in valuing Pigouvian prices for
greenhouse gas damages (see, for example, Woodward and Bishop 1995, 1997; Howarth 1996a,
1998).
Several other papers by Howarth, alone and with Norgaard, help to show the full analytical power of
the OLG approach to sustainability. Howarth (1991a) first extends the results of Howarth and
Norgaard (1990) to cover the case of many generations and to use labor and capital as inputs to
production, then includes uncertain technical progress and showed how this makes the socially
optimal transfers among generations risk-averse (Howarth 1991b). Howarth and Norgaard (1993)
consider a range of intergenerational welfare functions and showed how, even if one generation cares
about the next, transfers caused by private altruism may not maximize welfare. They also explore the
relationship between intergenerational transfers and intergenerational discounting, noting that
changes in discounting alter the intertemporal distribution of resources and thus also alter the rate of
return on investment. It follows that concerns in policy debates about “excessive” long-term
discounting can be reinterpreted as concerns about intergenerational resource allocation, without
Resources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
15
necessarily suggesting the need for massive intervention in capital markets to directly alter the
discount rate.
11Asheim (1988, 1991, 1996a) explores the formal foundations of an ethics of sustainability, though the
uncompromising rigor of the papers limits their readership to the technical, well-motivated few. In
particular, Asheim (1991) shows how a particular definition of intergenerational justice is equivalent
to a nondecreasing consumption constraint, like the kind of rising and then constant consumption path
later highlighted by Pezzey (1994).
12One implication drawn from this analysis is that any assumption of conventional PV optimality
effectively forecloses debate on intergenerational equity by giving all resource rights to the current
generation. This observation is true to a degree, but it must not be overstated. The current generation
cannot help existing earlier in time than its successors; this fact in and of itself does not create a moral
obligation. Rather, any moral obligation must derive from other considerations. This matter is
certainly not settled and may never be. In addition, the challenge to policymakers of finding
conceivable political and legal institutions to give resource rights to people not yet born is a difficult
one, to put it mildly.
Ecology–Environment Relationships
Another widely cited article written during this period is “Towards an Ecological Economics of
Sustainability” (Common and Perrings 1992), which aims to show how the concept of ecological
sustainability is very different from that of economic sustainability. The former involves resilience,
conceived of as stability of the parameters defining an ecological–economic system.
parameters include biological and engineering parameters in production functions, and psychological
parameters in utility functions. The key conclusion is that economic efficiency is not necessary for
ecological sustainability and, indeed, can conflict with it: “If existing preferences and technologies
13 In turn, these11
distinction between intertemporal and intergenerational discounting and Mourmouras’ (1993) OLG model of
efficiency and equity.
Other important papers in this general area of literature included Burton’s (1993) clarification of the12
a societal aversion to income inequality. Hamilton (1995) clarified some technical relationships that may but do
not always hold among sustainable development, a generalized Hartwick’s rule, and PV optimality. Heyes and
Liston-Heyes (1995) noted that a nondeclining utility constraint can cause a strictly Pareto-inferior consumption
path to be chosen. However, this path can often be avoided by including the best available nondeclining path in
the choice set.
Other relevant literature includes an article by Collard (1994), who considered sustainability in the context of13
sustainability.
See the article by Perrings (1995) for further analysis of the relationship between resilience andResources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
16
are not ecologically sustainable, then consumer sovereignty implies system instability.
ecological economics of sustainability implies an approach that privileges the requirements of the
system above those of the individual.” This provocative paper is highly formal mathematically yet
somewhat loose in conception, so it is difficult to read.
Several other studies consider how biophysical limits affect economic activity; Cleveland and Ruth
(1997) provide a useful survey of much of this literature.
“neo-Austrian” approach to investment, output, and the environment, which relies on an activity
analysis with less substitutability between various factors of production (see Faber and others 1990
for an earlier example of this approach). Victor (1991) provided an early and frequently cited
exposition of different sustainability concepts and their relationships to resource substitution
possibilities.
… [A]n14 Several articles also have explored theThe Beginnings of Empirical Sustainability Work
Despite a steady flow of work on the related topic of “green national accounting” (as in Repetto
1989), relatively little empirical work has been published on sustainability. No doubt this scarcity
reflects in part the theoretical challenges discussed later. The first major paper was “Capital Theory
and the Measurement of Sustainable Development: An Indicator of ‘Weak’ Sustainability” (Pearce
and Atkinson 1993). The authors attempt to use data for 18 real economies (from the United States to
Burkina Faso) to examine the “weak sustainability” of these economies in the sense of Hartwick
(1990) and Victor (1991). In the notation of our Model (1), Pearce and Atkinson calculate the savings
ratio
) / ( F K•
, depreciation as a proportion of output (
proportion
arrive at a measure of overall sustainability.
δK/F), and resource depletion rents as a similar([F (R G(S)) R] / F) R − −ξ ; the second and third values are subtracted from the first to15The economies of Japan and all the European countries in the sample were determined to be
definitely sustainable, essentially because of high savings rates and low resource depletion rents (the
latter perhaps because these countries have relatively few resources left to deplete). By contrast, the
economies of all the African countries in the sample were judged to be definitely unsustainable,
because of low savings rates and high depletion rents. The United States was labeled as marginally
sustainable, only because its savings rate is much lower than that of Europe or Japan. Pearce and
14
dimensions of the debate that surround this subject.
Several other articles in the same special issue of Ecological Economics will help the reader understand the15
Pearce and others (1993, 43) present details about a similar calculation for the United Kingdom.Resources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
17
Atkinson (1993) thus focus useful empirical attention on savings-funded investment in human-made
capital as well as natural resource depletion as an important determinant of sustainability, if one
“believes” in the substitutability of the former for the latter.
However, there are at least two major flaws in Pearce and Atkinson’s approach. First, technical
progress, or what might be referred to as an increase in “knowledge capital,” is ignored. Because of
the absence of measures of technical progress, calculations based on current prices can unfortunately
yield a false positive or a false negative message about an economy’s sustainability. We return to this
topic later in our discussion of the 1997 article by Weitzman.
Second, the implicit assumption is that observed prices used to estimate resource rents [
(1)] can say something useful about sustainability. Both Asheim (1994) and Pezzey (1994) point out
the flaw in this assumption. Asheim’s presentation in “Net National Product as an Indicator of
Sustainability” (1994) is technically difficult, but its intuitive message is simple. Because
sustainability is a macroeconomic concept, shifting an economy from unsustainability to
sustainability changes all its prices. Sustainability prices and sustainability itself are thus related in a
circular fashion: Without sustainability prices, we cannot know whether the economy is currently
sustainable; but without knowing whether the economy is currently sustainable, currently observed
prices tell us nothing definite about sustainability. In particular, net national product (consumption
plus the sum of investment minus depreciation for all asset types) equals the maximum sustainable
level of consumption only if an economy is already on a constant consumption path.
FR in Model161997–2000: A Flourishing but Still Developing Literature
The last few years covered in this review can be conveniently demarcated by the publication of a
special issue of the journal
as continued relevant journal publications elsewhere (notably,
number of relevant books and conference proceedings.
Several these publications are useful extensions of previous work. Norton and Toman (1997) extend
their analysis of “two-tier” decision frameworks for sustainability to develop a multicriteria model of
environmental impact assessment. Farmer and Randall (1997, 1998) further formalize the notions of
Land Economics devoted to sustainability issues (November 1997) as wellEcological Economics) and a growing16
capital gains terms, and later focused on the differences between consumption-based and utility-based measures
of net national product (NNP) and the role of technical progress (Asheim 1997). Both papers include explicit
attention to the case of a nonconstant interest rate. Asheim (2000) provides a grand synthesis of relationships
among sustainable income and three other income measures in a closed economy.
Asheim (1996b) showed how constant consumption rules in a world with different economies must includeResources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
18
intergenerational transfer and the safe minimum standard. Howarth (1997) synthesizes ideas on the
concept of “sustainability as opportunity.” Faucheux and others (1997) offer a revealing simulationbased
analysis of the limitations of weak sustainability indicators, using an OLG model derived from
Howarth’s work and building on the ideas of Asheim, Pezzey, and others. Stern (1997) neatly
encapsulates the issues that arise in defining both individual preferences and (limited) production
substitution possibilities. Portney and Weyant (1999) present a collection of essays on discounting
and intergenerational equity with papers by several leading experts in the field (see also Weitzman
1998).
17Verbal/Philosophical Analyses
In “On the Problem of Achieving Efficiency and Equity, Intergenerationally,” Page (1997) compares
two approaches to the problem of achieving the socially chosen goals of intergenerational efficiency
and intergenerational equity. In the first, standard benefit–cost analyses (that is, calculations of PV)
are done first, and then intergenerational equity is considered separately. In the second, efficiency and
equity considerations are integrated from the start. Page defines intergenerational equity in terms of
Thomas Jefferson’s principle of usufruct: If the resource base (including both natural resources and
human-made capital) as a whole is kept intact over generational time, then each generation is treated
equally.
Page then discusses the problems of sustaining the whole resource base that are posed by limits to
substitutability and technical progress. In an application of David Hume’s idea of the “circumstances
of justice,” he points out that sustainability may best provide guidance for decisions if the problems of
maintaining the resource base in usufruct are neither impossibly difficult nor trivially easy. Page
emphasizes that many social decisions are made neither in markets nor by marketlike benefit–cost
criteria, but through legal and political institutions. As a society, we can choose to elevate
sustainability to more of a “constitutional” principle; however, the dividing line between social
decisions to be made using individualistic economic criteria and those using more collective
mechanisms is not clearly marked.
17
controversy about both the methods used to measure the value of ecosystem services and the underlying
approach (for example, the attempt to value total services versus a change in the flow of services).
18This period also saw the publication of an article in Nature (Costanza and others 1997) that ignited huge18
arguments are couched in somewhat specialized philosophical language and contain some straw man criticisms
of conventional economic reasoning.
Bromley (1998) is even more sharply critical of the reliance on market-based thinking; however, hisResources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
19
One approach to resolving the tension between conventional economic criteria (benefit–cost analysis
or, equivalently, PV maximization) and sustainability—firmly in the “traditional” sustainability camp
and thus quite different from that put forth by Page (1997)—is suggested by Pezzey (1997) in
“Sustainability Constraints versus ‘Optimality’ versus Intertemporal Concern, and Axioms versus
Data.” Pezzey defends the possible use of different variants of sustainability as a prior constraint on
PV optimality. He argues that such a constraint is not self-contradictory, redundant, or inferior,
contrary to the claims of Beckerman (1994) and Dasgupta (1995). In so doing, Pezzey questions the
axiomatic foundation of PV maximization as set out by Koopmans in 1960. In particular, he
challenges the validity of Koopmans’ stationarity axiom, an axiom that Page (1997) also describes as
having “strikingly unappealing normative properties.”
Pezzey also suggests an alternative to sustainability constraints and to the tradition of analyzing
constraints by appealing to “moral intuitions” when selecting from among conflicting axioms. He
proposes an empirical approach that relies on psychological experiments on time preferences to
extend the intertemporal welfare function in Model (1) to include a finite (and therefore not
overriding) “value of sustainability” in some way (see also Pezzey 1992). This extension might
involve replacing the instantaneous utility function with a more complex function that includes the
individual’s value of improvements in consumption. An important feature of this approach is that it
may result in Pareto-inefficient consumption paths being preferred. The analytical implications
remain untested so far, as does its practicality for an empirical approach to characterizing the value of
sustainability.
Analytical Treatments of Sustainability, Efficiency, and Intergenerational Equity
A largely independent contribution to the “traditional” sustainability literature is “An Axiomatic
Approach to Sustainable Development” (Chichilnisky 1996). Chichilnisky works in a discrete-time
framework that can apply to either OLGs or non-OLGs and can allow for the functional form of
instantaneous utility to vary from generation to generation.
Chichilnisky proposes two standard and two extra axioms that any intertemporal welfare function
W
ordering, that is, a function whose maximization provides an acceptable criterion for optimally
sustainable development. First,
streams) and “sensitive” (able to give higher rank to a stream that Pareto-dominates another stream).
These axioms are satisfied by the PV criterion, but the extra two axioms that Chichilnisky adds are
not:
(.) that maps a utility stream {ut} to a real number should satisfy to be a “sustainable preference”W(.) should be both “complete” (able to rank any two feasible utilityW(.) should also satisfy both “no dictatorship of the present” (utility streams cannot be rankedResources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
20
only on the basis of a finite number of initial generations) and “no dictatorship of the future” [utility
streams cannot be ranked if a finite, positive number of initial generations are ignored by
Chichilnisky proves that the welfare function
W(.)].=
=
→∞
∞
=
Σ + Σ < ∞ ∞1 1({ }) lim ,
t
t t t t
t t t
where the positive discount factors (
sustainable preference. Several other well-known welfare measures then turn out not to be sustainable
preferences: any sum of discounted utilities, Ramsey’s criterion of minimizing the distance between
{
needs approach. Moreover, with the added restrictions that
proves that a sustainable
W u λ u u λ (2)λt) need not be of negative exponential form, is indeed aut} and a “bliss” utility level, the overtaking criterion, long-run averages, Rawlsian rules, and a basicW(.) is continuous and independent, sheW(.) must be of the form({ }) ({ })
1
t
t
t t t
u u u W φ λ Σ∞
=
= +
where
giving weight to the welfare of far-distant generations.
Such a
sum of utilities. It remains to be seen whether this promising and rigorous development of
sustainability theory will be more operational or more politically acceptable than any of the most
frequently suggested options in current debates.
In “On Sustainability and Intergenerational Transfers with a Renewable Resource,” Krautkraemer
and Batina (1999) build on the OLG framework developed by Mourmouras (1993). They explore
some issues of intergenerational equity in an economy that depends on a renewable resource with a
strictly concave growth function and has a maximum sustainable stock (or carrying capacity) of
They find that depending on parameters such as the resource payment’s share of total output and the
private utility discount factor (
the resource is not exhausted or rendered extinct) could entail Pareto-inefficient overaccumulation of
the resource, so that
there is initial overaccumulation of the resource [
produces a Pareto-inefficient path: A path of declining consumption can result in higher utility for all
generations than a constant consumption path that maintains the less productive state of
overaccumulation. This result is interesting mainly in illustrating the potential conflict between Pareto
efficiency and sustainability criteria, and the fact that “the desirability of a particular social welfare
(3)φ({ut}) is a “purely finitely additive measure,” which is a generalization of the concept ofW(.) generates an allocation very different from that arising from maximizing the discountedSM.α and φ in our notation), the market equilibrium (if it exists—that is, ifS∞ > SM where S∞ is the asymptotic resource stock. They also demonstrate that ifS(0) > SM], then a nondeclining utility constraintResources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
21
criterion cannot be determined independently of its implications in different technological situations”
(pp. 178, 180).
Empirical Sustainability Work
Weitzman (1997) covers both theory and empiricism in “Sustainability and Technical Progress.” We
include this article in this section rather than the previous one because we think its empirical result is
just as important as its theoretical result.
Using a model with a linear utility function and a constant interest rate, Weitzman first generalizes his
earlier result (Weitzman 1976) that on the PV-maximizing path, the annuity equivalent of the PV of
consumption equals net national product (NNP), defined as current consumption plus aggregate stock
changes (human made and natural) valued at PV-optimal prices. The 1997 extension shows that when
the production possibilities set allows for exogenous technical progress over time (as measured by the
“Solow residual” of neoclassical growth theory), the annuity equivalent of consumption will equal
NNP adjusted by a multiplier that reflects in particular “… the pure effect of time alone on
enhancement of productive capacity not otherwise attributable to capital accumulation” (p. 7).
Weitzman suggests a criterion for judging the sustainability of current consumption: It should be no
more than its annuity equivalent, as adjusted for the impact of exogenous technical progress. As noted
previously (Asheim 1994; Pezzey 1994), this criterion does not rule out the possibility of future
declines in consumption. It is much more likely to be met if the upward adjustment to NNP from
technical progress is much bigger than any possible downward adjustment from including resource
depletion and environmental degradation as part of “green” national accounting.
Empirically, this result is just what Weitzman estimates (albeit crudely) for the U.S. economy. He
concludes (p. 11) that while the total cost of environmental remediation and resource depletion for the
United States is on the order of 2% of the gross national product (GNP), the “technological change
premium” augments the GNP by about 40%. By Weitzman’s definitions and calculations, therefore,
the U.S. economy is very comfortably sustainable, and “sustainability would appear to depend more
critically on future projections of the [technological progress] residual than on the typical corrections
now being undertaken in the name of green accounting” (p. 12). Although the theoretical link
between the national accounting measures and sustainability is problematic, Weitzman’s provocative
empirical results form an important challenge to those concerned about sustainability, one that cries
out for further exploration and discussion. Some issues relevant to further evaluation include
accounting for the endogenous accumulation of human and intellectual capital (which would reduce
the estimate of exogenous productivity growth); refining the measures of environmental degradation,
Resources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
22
including global considerations; and accounting for how adverse impacts of U.S. economic activity
might be enhanced by trade, if imports are far more resource-intensive than exports.
The last of these factors is not significant, according to calculations reported in “International Trade
and the Sustainability Footprint: A Practical Criterion for Its Assessment,” in which Proops and
others (1999, 84) note that the carbon intensity of U.S. imports was actually lower than the carbon
intensity of its exports. But the main focus of this article is to show that one way or another, trade in
both resources and resource-intensive goods is certainly significant in real-world analyses of
sustainability for most countries. We chose it rather than other conventional analyses (for example,
Asheim 1996b; Vincent and others 1997)
and empirically clear (though debatable) development of the idea of “exporting unsustainability”
suggested by Pearce and others (1989, 45–47). This idea, which has since gained much currency in
debates on trade and environment and “fair trade,” states that rich, industrialized countries, which
import large amounts of resources (or resource-intensive goods ultimately derived) from countries
that are depleting their resources unsustainably, bear some responsibility for this unsustainability.
The set of disaggregated calculations for various countries from Proops and others centers on the
difference between two key measures of sustainability. The first is
analogous to the measure used by Pearce and Atkinson (1993); its theoretical shortcomings mean that
it can only be viewed as a rough guide. The second measure is
replaces calculations of the capital and resources used “by” an economy with the capital and
resources used “for” or “attributable to” an economy. The latter parameters are calculated by matrix
algebra derived from an input–output analysis of world trade flows.
The single most important empirical finding by Proops and his collaborators is that moving from the
closed economy to the open economy dramatically increases the calculated sustainability of resourcebased
regions such as the Middle East, and reduces it for industrial regions such as western Europe
and the United States (see Proops and others 1999, figures 5b and 6b). However, despite their
contention that “industrialised countries appropriate the carrying capacity of other countries (e.g., by
importing natural resources), therefore benefiting at the expense of their trading partners” (p. 77),
19 to include in this review because it gives an analyticallyclosed economy sustainability,open economy sustainability, which19
income in a way that accounts for the effects of capital gains in an open, resource-exporting economy. The need
for such a calculation is underscored by the fact that resource prices have typically been flat or falling, not rising
as in most theoretical models. A more radical view of trade and sustainability is expressed in Gowdy and
McDaniel’s (1999) case study of guano export from the Pacific Island of Nauru, even though the analysis is
hampered by gaps in data.
Vincent and others (1997) empirically illustrate (for the case of Indonesia) how to calculate sustainableResources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
23
Proops his collaborators draw no conclusions from their calculations for either national or
international policymaking. Missing from their framework is a characterization of how and to what
extent free trade is unfair and exploitative.
A fitting conclusion to our selection of papers, which highlights both what has been achieved and
what remains unclear or unresolved, is “Measuring Sustainability: A Time Series of Alternative
Indicators for Scotland” (Hanley and others 1999). Hanley and others heroically estimate and
compare seven sustainability measures for Scotland during the period 1980–93. The measures are
drawn from a wider set of 17 indicators, including both single and aggregate measures in economic,
ecological/environmental, and sociopolitical categories. The latter two categories broadly match the
“folk” idea (reflected in Barbier 1987) that economic, environmental, and social sustainability are
three separate concepts. The indicators vary not only in their detailed definition but also in whether
they include a clear test of sustainability versus unsustainability. Unlike in the analysis by Proops and
others (1999), none of these categories makes any allowance for trade.
The two economic indicators of “weak sustainability”—green net national product (GNNP) as
developed from Hartwick (1990) and genuine savings as developed from Pearce and Atkinson
(1993)—yield somewhat surprisingly different results. GNNP shows Scotland to be increasingly
sustainable over the period; genuine savings shows it to be unsustainable, but becoming less so. One
reason for this discrepancy is that GNNP uses investment data, whereas genuine savings uses savings
data that come from a different administrative source and may diverge widely from investment in a
small open economy such as Scotland. The three ecological/environmental indicators of “strong
sustainability” reveal Scotland to be either marginally sustainable with slight improvement, or
marginally unsustainable with little change. The two sociopolitical indicators (Index of Sustainable
Economic Welfare and the Genuine Progress Indicator) involve ad hoc adjustments of conventional
GDP per capita aimed at finding a better measure of instantaneous utility, and have no direct
connection with sustainability as intergenerational equity. The diversity of results from the various
indicators and practical problems in their definition indicate how far we still have to go in developing
reliable and widely accepted measures of sustainability.
Concluding Remarks
For all the legitimate criticism that can be leveled at the somewhat amorphous nature of
sustainability, we believe some important basic lessons have emerged from the sustainability studies
covered or referred to in this review.
First, there is no clear understanding of, let alone consensus around, what constitutes a sustainability
objective or standard. It is clearly more than a simple PV criterion. But what it is, who decides what it
Resources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
24
is, and how that decision is made, continue to bedevil analysts of all stripes—just as similar questions
about individual and social responsibility have been torments for millennia. We will not find answers
to this question by resorting only to a priori philosophical constructs.
Second, efficiency and equity are different concepts, and economists need to maintain this distinction
when analyzing issues related to long-term economic progress and the natural environment. In
particular, values of long-term environmental costs and benefits ultimately depend on some implicit
or explicit assumptions about the intergenerational distribution of income, hence about the current
generation’s obligations (if any) to future generations.
Third, economic analytical frameworks typically contain implicit as well as explicit presumptions
about the prospects for both resource substitution and resource-augmenting technical innovation.
These assumptions may or may not prove to be satisfactory, but the empirical foundation underneath
them is not as strong as it could be.
Finally, and more generally, the dearth of empirical work on what sustainability might mean for
environmental and economic valuations, and the continued lack of concrete understanding of what
“sustainability policies” might entail in practice, indicate the scale of continued intellectual challenges
in the field.
Resources for the Future Pezzey and Toman
25
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